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RESUME 
En combinant des données macro-économiques sur 45 pays et des données micro-économiques sur 4 pays 
comparables, nous révélons l’existence de différences entre les niveaux d’éducation atteints en Afrique selon 
l’identité du colonisateur. En 1960, les ex-colonies britanniques affichaient une performance éducative 
supérieure. Ces différences sont robustes au contrôle de certains facteurs pré-coloniaux et ont persisté dans le 
temps jusqu’en 1990. Cependant, le différentiel  d’éducation ne s’est pas transformé en différences de revenu 
ou d’espérance de vie. Les ex-colonies françaises se sont urbanisées plus rapidement. Les données micro-
économiques sur les pays d’étude montrent bien que les rendements privés de l’éducation tendent à être 
moins élevés dans les ex-colonies britanniques. 
ABSTRACT 
Macroeconomic data on 45 countries are combined with microeconomic data on 4 case-study countries to 
reveal significant differences in the levels of education attained under the different colonial powers in Africa 
during the colonial period. In 1960, former British colonies exhibited higher educational performance. These 
differences are robust to the control of some pre-colonial factors and have persisted over time until 1990. 
However, the education differential did not give rise to either income per capita or life expectancy 
differentials. Urbanisation occurred at a faster rate in the former French colonies. Microeconomic data for 
the case-study countries show indeed that private returns to education tend to be lower in the former British 
colonies. 
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1. Introduction1
Recent economic papers highlight the in‡uence that colonisation and its charac-
teristics have had on national institutions and subsequently the countries’ eco-
nomic development paths following independence. However, they diverge as to
the respective in‡uence of the colonial power’s identity and the colonised region’s
characteristics. One set of papers concludes that the colonial power’s identity is
the deciding factor, because of the strong e¤ect it would have had on the e¢-
ciency of the countries’ legal systems. It maintains that the British common-law
system and the Protestant in‡uence fostered the construction of a modest and
e¢cient government, whereas French civil law2 and the Catholic in‡uence fos-
tered a development-impeding interventionist government (La Porta et al., 1998
and 1999).3 A second series of papers places the emphasis on the colonies’ ini-
tial characteristics, notwithstanding the colonial power’s identity. In regions with
poor health conditions where it was hard for Europeans to settle, the colonial
powers would have favoured unstable private property rights (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, 2001). In regions initially rich in pro…table natural resources, they
would have set up pro…t-extracting highly inequitable institutions (Sokolo¤ and
Engerman, 2000). Both factors handicapped long-run human and physical capital
accumulation, resulting in some “reversals of fortune” over the last four centuries
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002).
This paper also looks at the respective in‡uences of the colonial power and
initial conditions on development paths. It concentrates on Africa and on the
di¤erences between the former British colonies and the former French colonies.
This intra-continental comparative analysis has a number of advantages. Firstly,
it checks for common geographical, biological and anthropological features in the
African countries. Secondly, the timing if not the reasons behind the European
colonial takeover was pretty much the same for all countries, which means that
the length and the historical period of colonial rule can be controlled for. Fol-
1I would like to thank the DELTA-DIAL-ENSAE-INRA(LEA) and EDOCIF seminars par-
ticipants, especially Jean-Pierre Cling, Sylvie Lambert and Thomas Piketty for their valuable
comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
2The authors place the label French Origin on not only France and former French colonies,
but also on the Latin-in‡uenced countries (Spain, Portugal and Italy) and the Netherlands and
its former colonies.
3We focus on the econometric work. Acemoglu et al (2000) trace the legal system argument
back to von Hayek. Even though Weber (1978) is often cited in support of this type of argument,
he actually emphasises capitalism’s ability to adapt (pp. 891-892).
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lowing the slave trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Europeans
quickly and completely invaded the African continent. The “Scramble for Africa”
(Pakenham, 1991) was concentrated in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.
The continent’s formal decolonisation again came about late and swiftly, mainly
around 1960. Thirdly, bitter territorial competition between the European powers
resulted in a more balanced sharing out of the continent, which was set in stone
by a number of treaties in the last few years of the century and only changed for
the former German colonies after the First World War (Brunschwig, 1972; Wes-
seling, 1991; and Pakenham, 1991). The fact that the sharing of the continent
among European countries was more balanced than in America or Asia facili-
tates a satisfactory econometric identi…cation of the e¤ect of the colonial power’s
identity.
A comparison of situations in the former British and French colonies at the
time of their independence in 1960 provides information on the di¤erential im-
pact of British and French colonial policies. A comparison of the same countries
thirty years later, in 1990, identi…es the extent to which the di¤erences resulting
from colonial rule persisted. This paper sets out to econometrically identify these
cross-sectional di¤erences, by taking into account a number of relevant factors that
prevailed at the time of the colonial carve-up, such as the spread of Islam, ethnic
fragmentation, health conditions and natural resources. This paper is also inno-
vative in that it compares macroeconomic indicators with similar variables drawn
from representative microeconomic surveys of large household samples. Given
that processing and comparing microeconomic databases is such a long-winded
task, we con…ne our study to four countries that appear to be su¢ciently compa-
rable and representative of British and French colonisation in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar and Uganda. Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana (former
Gold Coast) are of two neighbouring countries with a large number of similarities.
We hence accord them special attention.
The former British and French colonies were fairly similar from the point
of view of a large number of economic and institutional variables in 1960. For
instance, they were equally poor and life expectancy was equally low. These
similarities continued through to 1990. In contrast, we found that the populations
in the British colonies had a higher average level of education in 1960, and we show
that this advantage persisted if not increased through to 1990. This educational
di¤erence is important since, in most cases aside from North Africa, the European
colonisers introduced reading and writing into societies using oral communication.
However, this educational advantage did not result in higher growth in the former
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British colonies. This …nding adds to the questions about the role of education in
growth raised by Pritchett (2001) and Bils and Klenow (2000), among others.
The second section of this paper presents the econometric methodology used
and makes some comments about some related previous papers. Section 3 doc-
uments the former British colonies’ educational advantage and proposes some
historical explanations for it. Section 4 looks at income and standards of living
and raises the question of returns to education in Africa.
2. Identifying the consequences of colonisation
Recent economic research on development gaps focuses on separating out the ef-
fects of (i) intangible geographic factors (distance to the equator, climate, access
to the sea and soil quality), (ii) historically determined institutions (language,
religion, legal and judicial systems, and political regimes), and (iii) economic poli-
cies (trade, monetary and …scal policies). These three factors are obviously not
independent. Location can in‡uence institutions, with the institutions a¤ecting
policy implementation and success rates, and policy performance determining in-
stitutional change. Nevertheless, there is now a consensus that development gaps
are due less to di¤erences in capital accumulation and educational attainment
than to the institutions that organize the use of economic resources (Hall and
Jones, 1999), regardless of the emphasis placed on any of these three factors.
Empirical studies that endeavour to explain development di¤erences come up
against the central econometric question of the endogeneity of the explanatory
variables. The problem generally4 consists in estimating the following equation:
Yi = f(Xi; Di) + ui (2.1)
where for each country i, Y is an outcome variable (like for instance the per
capita GDP or the average level of education), X is a control variables vector, D
a treatment variable (here the colonial power’s identity) whose e¤ect we want to
evaluate, and u an unobserved variable containing the e¤ect of all other factors
determining Y but also possibly X or D. The absence of independence between
(X; D) and u introduces a bias into the naive estimators of E(Y jD; X).
If it can be assumed that African regions were relatively randomly shared
among the colonial powers, then whatever the outcome variable Y; and for the
4In this formulation, the e¤ects of the observables and unobservables are assumed to be
additively separable. While this is a usual assumption in econometrics, it is not necessary in
the case of the matching estimators considered hereafter.
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coloniser’s identity D, u is independent of D. The dividing up of Africa may
be considered to be a "natural experiment" whereby di¤erent colonial policies
were applied in statistically similar regions in terms of geography and anthropol-
ogy. However, there is reason to believe that the matching of African regions
to colonial powers was determined by the balance of power between the Euro-
pean nations and each of their objectives and/or by each African region’s speci…c
comparative advantages. For instance, a given colonial power might have suc-
ceeded in gaining the more pro…table regions with the most natural resources, as
asserted by Chamberlain and Lord Salisbury on the British side, or the regions
with the most acceptable health conditions and climate for Europeans. Some
colonial powers might have succeeded in avoiding the more resistant pre-colonial
societies, settling in regions initially more open to trade or societies more likely
to be converted to Christianity. All of these selection elements could have in turn
in‡uenced the African countries’ educational attainments.
Consider, for instance, a dummy variable D which takes the value of 1 if the
country was colonised by the British and the value of 0 if not.5 Then, assume
that this colonial partition was based on a vector of observable variables S and
unobservable variables v:
Di = 1 if Si° ¡ vi ¸ 0 (2.2)
Di = 0 if not (2.3)
This vector S should hence include all the factors that could have governed the
partition: health and climatic conditions, richness in natural resources, population
density, existence of an organized government, access to the sea, the penetration
of Islam and initial ethnic fragmentation. Those factors that directly in‡uenced
Y and can be observed can be included in X.
Correctly estimating the e¤ect of D on Y calls for additional hypotheses con-
cerning u and v.
A …rst, somewhat intuitive solution is found in the matching estimators in-
troduced by Rubin. It consists in assuming that the colonial partition was based
on the S variables alone. For instance, the colonial powers might not have had a
larger information set than S for the di¤erent African regions. This assumption
5Hereinafter, we restrict our analyses to the case of a dichotomous treatment variable. This
case is not perfectly suited to our subject, since the Scramble for Africa was made by more than
two colonial powers. Lechner (2000) extends the matching estimators introduced by Rubin to
more than two types of mutually exclusive treatments. His proposal has yet to be applied in
later work, but we believe that it would have little e¤ect on our …ndings.
7
produces the following ‘conditional independence’ hypothesis:
Pr(D = 1jY0; Y1; S) = Pr(D = 1jS) = P (S) (2.4)
where Y0 (resp. Y1) is the observed outcome in the absence (resp. presence)
of treatment D.
The method then consists in comparing countries that are similar in terms of
the S vector, but which were colonised by di¤erent European countries. Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983) show that it is su¢cient to match countries with similar
probabilities of being colonised by the same colonial power, i.e. countries with
a similar ’propensity score’ P (S). The di¤erence between outcomes Y0 and Y1
observed for countries with similar propensity scores P(S) provides information
on the e¤ect of the colonial power’s identity.6 One of the main advantages of
matching estimators lies in the fact that they do not call for supplementary hy-
potheses regarding the functional form of f or the distribution of u and v. Their
main drawback is that they disallow the possibility of selection by unobservables.
A second solution is then provided by the parametric selection models in-
troduced by Heckman. Nevertheless, the method calls for a speci…cation of the
functional form of f and the distribution of unobservables u and v.7 Usual spec-
i…cations are a linear model for Y 8, and a bidimensional normal distribution for
(u; v):
Yi = Xi¯ + ®Di + ui (2.5)
(u; v) Ã N (0;§) (2.6)
Here again, S and X may be either identical or di¤erent9.
6The S and X vectors may be identical or di¤erent. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998)
propose a matching procedure for the case of an exogenous X, drawing on the relation between
Y and X using local non-parametric regressions as well as the di¤erences between S and X.
Where X is endogenous, some instruments Z have to be found for X. Subsequently, either all
these instruments can be introduced into S or the Heckman, Ichimura and Todd estimator can
be used for the reduced model relating Y and Z. For the sake of simplicity, the …rst solution
was chosen (all instruments Z included in S).
7Lewbel (2002) proposes a semi-parametric estimator of this kind of model, which uses a con-
tinuous large support auxiliary variable V in‡uencing D without in‡uencing Y . This estimator
could be used in later work.
8In this case, the relation between Y and X no longer depends on D. This hypothesis could
be relaxed by writing a Roy-type shifting model. However, this would give rise to a fairly large
number of parameters to be estimated compared with the size of the sample.
9However, in order to limit the weight of the parametric identi…cation hypothesis, we dictate
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None of the recent studies of the role of the colonial power’s identity considers
the non-random nature of the matching between colonial powers and colonised
regions or the potential endogeneity of the control variables. In La Porta et al.
(1999), Y is an indicator of the quality of government services and X contains
the spread of the major religions, latitude and even per capita GNP, which is
clearly endogenous. When such highly di¤erent colonies as the USA, Peru, In-
dia and Cote d’Ivoire are compared, the list of potentially relevant characteristics
explaining development di¤erences is extremely long: available natural resources,
organisation of the pre-colonial societies and economies, length and type of colo-
nial rule, etc. For instance, the former colonies that have caught up with Western
Europe are all former British colonies (USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia,
Hong Kong and Singapore). Is this fact indicative of the quality of British colo-
nial rule or of the dynamism of Protestants as entrepreneurs? Or does it mean
that England, as the dominant European political and economic power in the eigh-
teenth and nineteenth centuries, occupied the regions with the best conditions for
capitalist development?10 Acemoglu et al. (2000) explain the contemporary level
of per capita GDP (Y ) by the contemporary rating of expropriation risks (X),
and instrument the latter variable using the mortality rate for European settlers
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. They then add dummy variables for
the colonial power’s identity to this basic equation. Once the fact that the British
more frequently colonised low mortality regions is taken into account, the colonial
power’s identity no longer appears to be a determinant of national income. Their
…ndings should, however, be more quali…ed by explicitly modelling the colonial
partition of the world. A paper by Brown (2000) is even closer to our subject of
study. Brown uses pooled panel data on 33 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from
1960 to 1985 to run four separate regressions relating the gross rates of primary
and secondary enrolment to per capita GDP for the two sub-samples of former
French colonies and former British colonies. For each level of per capita GDP, he
…nds that the former British colonies have higher primary enrolment rates and
lower secondary enrolment rates than the former French colonies. However, the
obvious endogeneity of GDP to schooling and other features of his econometric
that S contains one or more variables excluded from X. Where X is endogenous, it may be
replaced by its instruments Z (reduced model).
10Besides, the sample bias may sometimes be drastic. In La Porta et al. (1998), Kenya,
Zimbabwe and South Africa are the only African countries included in the "English [legal]
origin" countries, while the "French [legal] origin" countries include no African country except
for Egypt (!). This latter group is mainly made up of former Spanish colonies in Latin America.
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method raise many doubts about his …ndings. A paper by Bertocchi and Canova
(2002) also focuses on Africa and correlates an indicator of the colonial power’s
identity with growth of GDP per capita and other variables like the investment-
output ratio in 1960 and the percentage of working age population in secondary
school in 1960. Their results give an advantage to former British colonies on
those three variables. Like Brown, they however do not control for pre-colonial
conditions or settlement colonisation. In particular, they make no special case for
such colonies as South Africa, or for the South African dependencies (and former
British dominions) Lesotho and Swaziland they put at the same level than other
countries, which tends to overestimate the former British colony advantage.
This paper uses the two methods described above, i.e. matching estimators and
selection models, to obtain robust …ndings concerning the in‡uence of the colonial
power’s identity on the development paths of African countries. It shows that the
corrections made, especially by incorporating some exogenous control variables
such as the spread of Islam and European settlement conditions, considerably
alter the naive estimation of this in‡uence.
2.1. Pre-colonial conditions, colonial partition and education
We put together a sample of 45 Sub-Saharan African countries, comprising 15 for-
mer British colonies, 18 former French colonies, 10 other former colonies (Belgian,
Spanish, Italian and Portuguese), Liberia and Ethiopia. The sample excludes
Lesotho, Swaziland and Djibouti as well as small islands such as Cape Verde,
Comoros, Mauritius, Mayotte and Seychelles. Among the countries …rst colonised
by the Germans, Cameroon and Togo were divided between Britain and France,
the smaller British parts having been incorporated respectively into Nigeria and
Gold Coast (Ghana). In 1961, the southern part of formerly British Cameroon
voted in a referendum to unite with French Cameroon, and these two parts were
de…nitively united as a republic in 1972. German Eastern Africa was also split be-
tween British Tanganyika, merged on independence with Zanzibar (former British
protectorate) to form Tanzania, and the much smaller Portuguese Mozambique.
Somalia remained split between Italy and Britain until 1961 and was therefore
not classi…ed as a former British colony. Namibia, former German South Western
Africa, passed in 1921 under the control of the South African Union which was
a British dominion, and as such we classi…ed it as former British. Classi…cation
variations for these seven countries do not a¤ect our …ndings.
In addition to the colonial power’s identity, three control variables are consid-
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ered that could have directly in‡uenced the e¤ect of colonial policies on education.
The …rst two concern the initial anthropological conditions found by the di¤erent
colonial powers: the penetration of Islam and the extent of ethnic fragmenta-
tion. The third covers the conditions of colonial rule and di¤erentiates settlement
colonies from pure extractive colonies: the proportion of Europeans living in the
countries in 1900. Table 1 shows how a satisfactory instrumentation strategy iden-
ti…es these pre-colonial conditions. It also shows the di¤erences between former
British, French and other colonies with respect to our set of exogenous instrumen-
tal variables.
From the tenth to the nineteenth century, Islam gradually spread through
North Africa to the West and South of the Sahara and then along the Red Sea
and the northern coast of the Indian Ocean (Curtin et al., 1995, pp. 76-81).
Islam probably had a huge e¤ect on the colonial mark made on education. Firstly,
Koranic schools o¤ered an alternative to the schooling provided by missionaries
and the colonial administrations. Secondly, the missions were more reluctant to
set up in regions with a majority of Muslims (see Gi¤ord and Weiskel, 1971,
pp. 689-690). Even today, majority Muslim regions often lag behind in school
infrastructures. Last but not least, Muslim cultures tended to place restrictions
on the education of girls. Obviously, the current proportion of Muslims in each
country has in turn been in‡uenced by the spread of Christian-based education,
with this reverse causality raising an endogeneity problem. Yet, as shown in the
…rst column of Table 1, the distance to North Pole correlated with the pre-colonial
spread of Islam forms a good instrument for the current proportion of Muslims.
A high level of ethnic fragmentation is potentially indicative of the absence
of a strong pre-colonial government (with its own educational policy), and initial
linguistic dispersion11 may have handicapped indigenous language teaching. At
the same time, the colonial powers often used the ‘Divide and Rule’ strategy,
and today’s ethnic fragmentation is at least partly due to colonial classi…cations
(Horowitz, 2000, pp. 147-166). The second column of Table 1 shows that today’s
ethnic fragmentation index is negatively correlated to the distance to the equator,
and positively correlated to the distance to the North pole and the country’s
arable land area. Three factors could explain the non-linear e¤ect of latitude.
First, Neolithic Bantu migrations from the north to the south of the intertropical
11The variable we use (from Parker, 1997) is available without missing values for the 45 coun-
tries in our sample. It estimates the proportion of the majority ethnic group in the population.
For a sub-sample of 40 countries, this variable is negatively correlated to the 1960 Atlas Narodov
Mira variable used by Easterly and Levine (1997), with a correlation coe¢cient of 0.827.
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zone (Curtin et al., 1995, pp. 15-27; Diamond, 1997) may have intensi…ed this
fragmentation. Second, the thick forests of the inter-tropical zone also probably
prevented populations from mixing and kept ethnic groups isolated. Third, the
early integrating power of Islam and Arab colonisation in North Africa may have
curbed ethnic fractionalisation. As regards the e¤ect of the arable land area,
the larger the country the higher the probability of …nding a large number of
diverse human groups. Herbst (2000) stresses the impact of this variable on the
governments’ ability to exercise their authority and control in sparsely settled
regions.
European settlement colonisation was keenly shaped by prevailing pre-colonial
mortality and health conditions, as shown by Acemoglu et al. (2001) for a world-
wide sample of former colonies. Table 1, column 3 con…rms their …nding for
African countries. Moreover, the proportion of European settlers in 1900 is closely
correlated with the current listed number of mineral resources in the country.
However, the direction of the causality between these two variables is hard to in-
terpret. This factor also had a strong in‡uence on the length of railway lines built
through to 1925 and 1960 (see Table 10).12 Among other investments, European
settlement probably generated more investment in school infrastructures, either
for the settlers’ children or to upgrade African manpower.
The last two columns in Table 1 show that France more frequently colonised
Islamised regions, as may be deduced from the strong in‡uence of the distance to
the North Pole. However, all the colonial powers seem to have come across soci-
eties with similar degrees of ethnic fragmentation.13 Britain colonised countries
with less humidity than other countries and especially France, setting up living
conditions more conducive to European settlement. Last but not least, France
more frequently ruled regions with both a slightly lower pre-colonial14 population
density and a slightly lower arable land size.
Other unobservable factors could obviously have escaped our notice. For in-
12The proportion of European settlers in the 1900 population is taken from Acemoglu et al.
(2001), and originates from Mac Evedy and Jones (1978). The current listed number of minerals
is taken from Parker (1997). Its correlation with European settlement in 1900 is +0.698. Railway
line lengths in 1925 are provided by Mitchell (2001). Their correlation with European settlement
in 1900 is even stronger at +0.843.
13Moreover, there is no mention of any di¤erence of this kind in the histories of colonisation
that we have read (Wesseling, 1991; Pakenham, 1991; Newbury, 1999).
14Like Acemoglu et al. (2002), we used the population estimates for the year 1500 given by
Mac Evedy and Jones (1978). In some countries, the slave trade which began after 1500 had a
very strong impact on demographic growth.
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stance, given their Indirect Rule principle, the regions colonised by the British
could have had more structured governments, such as in the examples of Ghana
(Asante kingdom) and Uganda (Ganda kingdom). Conversely, given their assim-
ilationist ideal, the French could have avoided such structured administrations,
with Madagascar (Merina kingdom) and Benin (Dahomey kingdom) being excep-
tions to the rule. Here again, the histories of colonisation do not mention any
di¤erence of this kind. The British in Gold Coast, like the French in Madagascar,
had to …ght to impose their domination. We nevertheless use Heckman estimators
to endeavour to purge the data from unknown selection factors.
3. The colonial mark on education
3.1. The quantity of education received by the population during the
colonial period
The closest indicator we have found for the quantity of education received by the
population during the colonial period is the average number of years of schooling
for the population aged 15-60 in 1960. Two databases contain this variable, the
…rst in Barro and Lee (1996) and the second in Cohen and Soto (2001) for a smaller
sample of countries. As Cohen and Soto’s work uses population census …ndings
to limit extrapolations of missing data, we give preference to their estimates,
rounding them out with Barro and Lee’s data for countries not in their sample.
When direct census information is not available,15 the variable is constructed
based on time series of pupils by level, demographic series by age and estimates
of dropout and repeated year rates (see Cohen and Soto, op. cit., pp.11-18).
For the years from 1950 to 1960, enrolment …gures are taken from UNESCO
Statistical Yearbooks. For the years before 1950, some enrolment …gures are
taken from Mitchell (2001). Where data is missing for the period before 1950,
the assumption is that net intakes were the same as in 1950 (Cohen and Soto,
p. 26). In the case of Africa, some extremely large measurement errors obviously
result from the available data and the extrapolations made, especially for the years
before 1950. Furthermore, 13 countries in our sample have no data at all available
for this variable. It would hence be risky to draw a conclusion about colonial
educational policies from such an imperfect statistical indicator. We therefore use
three other variables in the form of the literacy rate in 1970 and the gross primary
15Cohen and Soto use census data for less than one third of the African countries after 1960
(see pp. 28-29).
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and secondary enrolment rates in 1960. As with the average years of schooling,
the literacy rate is a stock variable that applies to the adult population. Yet it
represents as much the quantity as the quality of the education provided. The
other two variables are ‡ow variables, constructed as the ratio of the number of
enrolled pupils at a given level to the size of the theoretical age bracket. They do
not take into account the length of curricula variations and they ignore repeated
year and dropout rate di¤erentials.
The …rst column of Table 2 hence shows that, in 1960, the population aged
15 to 60 in the former British colonies received on average one and a half year’s
more schooling than their counterparts in the former French colonies and other
countries. Given the low level of these human capital indicators, this also means
that the average number of years of schooling was approximately twice as high
in the former British colonies. Based on a slightly broader sample, Table 2 also
shows that the former British colonies had a literacy advantage of 10 to 20 points
in 1970. The di¤erences are much fuzzier for the primary and secondary enrolment
rates, where the e¤ect of British colonisation still appears to be positive, but fairly
insigni…cant.16
This observation could mean that certain non-British colonies had caught up
part of their enrolment lag for the 1960 school-age generations. Nevertheless,
bear in mind that these indicators do not measure the number of years of actual
schooling for individuals in each level and even less the quality of the education.
We will subsequently show that it could be said that the educational systems in
the former British colonies prompted a greater number of pupils to complete full
schooling with fewer repeated years (see also Mingat and Suchaut, 2000).
For each of these four variables, the second columns of each panel show the
GMM estimate for a model introducing the three colonial partition variables dis-
cussed in the previous section next to the colonial power’s identity. In keeping
with the developments in this section, these variables are instrumented by the
distance to the North Pole, the distance to the equator, the arable land area and
colonial settlers’ mortality (see Table 1). Table 2 shows that these three variables
have a signi…cant in‡uence on the schooling indicators. In all cases, the penetra-
tion of Islam and ethnic fragmentation have a negative e¤ect17 on the quantity of
education received, while the presence of European settlers in 1900 has a positive
16Even if gross enrollment rates may be higher than 100% due to out of age school attendance
it is not the case in our sample, and rate variables lie between 0 and 100%. Transformation by
a ln(x) ¡ ln(100 ¡ x) type of function alters none of the …ndings for the rate variables.
17Except in the case of the secondary enrolment rate, where Islam has a positive e¤ect.
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e¤ect. The introduction of these three variables narrows the di¤erences between
the former British and former French colonies. For example, the di¤erence be-
tween these two types of colonies falls from 1.3 to 0.8 for the number of years of
education and from 20 points to 12 points for literacy. These decreases are ex-
plained in the main by the fact that the French more frequently colonised already
Islamised regions. A secondary explanation is the fact that the British more often
set up settlement colonies. This …nding underscores the importance of checking
the di¤erences observed between colonisers against the conditions prevailing at
the start of colonisation.
The estimators presented in tables 3 and 4 take a step further in this regard
by setting out to directly control for the endogeneity of the colonial partition.
They …rst use a reduced model in which the three control variables in Table 2
are replaced by their instruments, i.e. by variables representing the pre-colonial
conditions. Model (2.1) is hence rewritten as follows:
Yi = g(Zi; Di) + ui (3.1)
Estimator (OLS) and estimator (SEL) each consider a linear version of this
model:
Yi = Zi± + ®Di + ui (3.2)
Columns (OLS) represent the ordinary least squares estimate of the linear re-
duced model. As the colonial power’s identity is always assumed to be exogenous,
the estimator is relatively close to the structural estimator in Table 2. Estimator
(SEL) makes a Heckman correction to the selection biases, whereby the British
colonisation dummy variable is considered to follow the probit model in Table 1.
Lastly, the (MB) and (MnB) estimators are Rubin matching estimators, here again
using the probit model in Table 1 as the propensity score. Estimator (MB) corre-
sponds to the e¤ect of British colonisation on the countries actually colonised by
the United Kingdom (treatment e¤ect on the treated). Estimator (MnB), on the
other hand, corresponds to the e¤ect of British colonisation on the non-colonised
countries (treatment e¤ect on the non-treated). Each of these four estimators is
calculated for the entire sample (British vs. All) and for a sample limited to just
the British and French colonies (British vs. French).
As regards the point estimation, all the estimators indicate that British coloni-
sation had a positive e¤ect on the average number of years in education in 1960
and on literacy in 1970 (Table 3). This e¤ect is generally signi…cantly di¤erent to
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zero, even though the con…dence intervals are fairly large. The estimator based
on a selection-by-unobservables model provides the least accurate estimates and
…nds a very small di¤erence in the number of years of education between the
former British colonies and the other countries. British colonisation most often
appears to have a positive e¤ect on the rates of primary and secondary enrolment
in 1960,18 but again less signi…cant than for stock variables. The ratio of the two
rates is indicative of the graduation ‡ows from primary to secondary education.
A high ratio indicates a more open secondary system and also greater selectivity
within the primary system. Contrary to Brown (2000), we hence …nd that the
secondary system is more open in the former British colonies (last panel of Table
4).
Microeconomic data on a few countries provide a striking illustration of this
section’s general …nding (Table 5). We used the surveys available to us to class
non-migrant men by their age when their country gained independence.19 The
two former British colonies, Ghana and Uganda, di¤er markedly from the two
former French colonies, Cote d’Ivoire and Madagascar, especially as regards the
oldest generations born in or before the 1940s. Madagascar developed occasional
primary schooling the earliest, and the Merina kingdom is known to have had a
schooling policy before French colonisation in the late nineteenth century. Yet this
advantage does give rise to a high proportion of individuals completing primary
school and disappears completely at the secondary level compared with the two
former British colonies. Ghana and Uganda had higher completion of primary
education rates and higher rates of graduation from primary to secondary school.
Ghana is by far the most well-equipped country as regards secondary education.
These historical microeconomic statistics are in perfect keeping with the number
of pupils recorded by Mitchell’s historical statistics (2001), reproduced in Table
6, for both Ghana’s overwhelming advantage and Uganda and Madagascar’s in-
termediate positions.
3.2. Colonial education policies
Colonial policies hence seem to explain a large part of the schooling di¤erences
observed between the former British colonies and the other countries. The British
18Excepting for the selection estimators which give negative albeit insigni…cant e¤ects.
19As the surveys were conducted from 1985 to 1994, the enrolment estimates we obtain are
admittedly a¤ected by di¤erential mortality at the oldest ages. However, this bias should a¤ect
all the countries in the same way.
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distinctiveness seems able to be linked to its attitude as regards Protestant mis-
sions and the principles behind its settlement and Indirect Rule policies. In set-
tlement colonies such as South Africa and Zimbabwe (formerly South Rhodesia),
we have already seen that the proportion of European settlers in 1900 directly
and positively in‡uenced the quantity of education observed in 1960. In the other
colonies, the Indirect Rule doctrine also entailed certain forms of segregation, e.g.
in terms of land rights (Le Bris et al. 1982, pp. 76-80). However, the British
set up a large number of primary schools even in colonies that were not settle-
ment colonies, especially between the two wars and despite the 1930s depression,
using the Education Department’s grant-in-aid system to subsidise Protestant
missions (Gi¤ord and Weiskel, op. cit., pp. 701-703). Secondary education was
then propelled forward as of 1945, driven by the growth in primary education and
popular African demand and despite the settlers’ reserves. Contrary to Brown’s
…ndings (2000), the data on the British colonies does not suggest a particular bias
against secondary education, any more than an elitist bias on the French side,
since the secondary enrolment rates were higher in the former British colonies
in 1960 (and in 1990). Even before 1945, the British side had a larger number
of secondary schools and universities: "British West Africa was a special case.
Primary education, left up to the missionaries, was taught in the vernacular lan-
guage in keeping with the principles of Indirect Rule (hence the importance of the
language work by the Protestant missionaries).20 Each territory had several sec-
ondary schools and there were three higher education establishments in West Africa
alone: Fourah Bay in Sierra Leone (established in 1877)21, Achimota College in
Gold Coast and Yaba Higher College in Lagos (established in 1934). This density
was remarkable, especially since the only other teacher training establishments in
Black Africa were Liberia College in Monrovia (1833), the William Ponty School
in French West Africa22, Makerere College in Uganda (1933, formerly a technical
college, established as a university in 1939), the Kenya Teacher Training College
(1939) and the Overtown Institution in Khondove founded by the Livingstonia
20Gi¤ord and Weiskel (op. cit., p. 699) note that the promotion of vernacular languages by
the British missionaries often consisted of combating the spread of Arabic.
21Sierra Leone’s society of educated Creoles had a considerable e¤ect on the spread of the
press and education in Gold Coast and Nigeria. See T. C. Mccaskie (1999) pp. 670-672 and
Gi¤ord and Weiskel (1971) p. 681.
22Name taken in 1916 by the Ecole Nationale d’Instituteurs established in West French Africa
in 1903, successor to the Collège des Fils des Chefs et des Interprètes set up in Saint-Louis in
1893 on the premises of the former Ecole Spéciale pour les Otages (1861).
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Mission in 1894"23(Coquery-Vidrovith and Moniot, 1974, pp. 199-200, my own
translation). This generated the emergence of an educated class of junior techni-
cians, primary school teachers and self-employed professionals who were, at the
same time, excluded from attaining the power retained by the traditional leaders.
The Indirect Rule doctrine did not generate political autonomy any faster than
elsewhere (Cell, 1999), since self-government was viewed merely as an extremely
remote prospect.24 The question could be asked as to whether this more gener-
ous education policy was not sanctioned precisely because education provided no
rights to power. This policy also included its own inherent contradiction, which
started to appear between the two wars (Gi¤ord and Weiskel, op. cit.). The new
educated elite excluded from the colonial power launched a dynamic press in the
nineteenth century and was behind the nationalist movements that took power
following independence.
Historians consider that the French initially relied more on the military for
colonisation, whereas British colonisation relied more on missionaries and traders
(Wesseling, op. cit.). These di¤erent methods suggest that the French colonial
power tended more frequently to challenge the pre-colonial government struc-
tures and possibly the positive in‡uence they might have had on the demand for
schooling. More importantly, however, the Dreyfus a¤air and the separation of
the Church from the State had direct repercussions on French educational policy
in the colonies from the beginning of the twentieth century (Gi¤ord and Weiskel,
op. cit., pp. 674-675). Gi¤ord and Weiskel list four basic features of this policy:
(i) uniformity of language, (ii) free of charge, (iii) secularity, and (iv) the connec-
tion with the demand for sta¤ for the administration. The obligation to provide
education in the French language is mentioned by many authors, such as Brown
(2000), as one of the main reasons for the lag in the development of teaching in the
colonial period. Nevertheless, vernacular language schooling by Catholic mission-
aries in the Belgian colonies (Manning, p. 165) does not appear to have generated
much better results. Moreover, although schooling in the French language might
23Contrary to what is suggested by Coquery-Vidrovitch, British West Africa (Gambia, Ghana,
Nigeria and Sierra Leone) does not appear to have a particular advantage over East Africa
(Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia). Both the Cohen and Soto indicator and
Mitchell’s statistics …nd that Kenya, for example, was at the same level as Ghana in both 1960
and 1990.
24In this regard, Young draws on Churchill’s opinion of Kenya in 1922 and on the vision of
Indirect Rule put forward by one of its main theorists and practitioners, Lugard, proconsul of
Nigeria. See Young, 1994, p. 170. Herbst moreover considers that Indirect Rule was only really
applied in Nigeria from the point of view of common land rights. See Herbst, op. cit., p. 196.
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have hindered the development of primary education, it should have made it easier
to graduate from primary to secondary education, where the colonial power’s lan-
guage was the rule in all cases. Yet nothing of the sort happened (see the above
analysis of the secondary and primary enrolment rates ratio). More generally,
Gi¤ord and Weiskel point out that English-speaking historians tend to espouse
the caricature of a French assimilation doctrine summed up by the expression,
“Our ancestors the Gauls . . . ”,25 whereas the question of adapting textbooks and
courses to local realities was raised repeatedly in the National Education system
(Gi¤ord and Weiskel, op. cit., pp. 666-669).26 However, on both the French
and British side, this concern to adapt textbooks and courses was quite often
in keeping with racist ideologies and broke with some initial enthusiasm for as-
similation (Gi¤ord and Weiskel, op. cit., p. 690). In addition to the language
issue, the French secular state primary schools almost certainly grew less in num-
ber than the subsidised Protestant missions in the British colonies. Providing
education free of charge called for high budgetary costs. The lack of expatri-
ate primary school teachers and the small contingent of locally trained primary
school teachers (the only teacher training college was in Dakar) doubtless limited
the development of education and helped maintain the gap between the former
French and former British colonies. "The separation of the Church from the State
meant that the missionary schools played a much smaller role (5,000 pupils in
French West Africa and barely over 1,000 in French East Africa as opposed to
20,000 in the Gold Coast alone in 1920) on French-occupied soil (except in the
mandates with a strong German missionary tradition). There were eight middle
schools (1,000 pupils) and only two secondary establishments, both in Senegal.
This colony, or the four communes to be more precise, bene…ted from the e¤orts
in the nineteenth century and remained extremely advantaged with one-quarter of
the school population for only 12% of the total French West African population in
1938"27 (Coquery-Vidrovitch and Moniot, op. cit. p. 200). The lack of primary
school teachers and administrative sta¤ was particularly acute during and after
the First World War and during the 1930s depression and the Second World War.
25Taken from a famous book published in 1937: W.B. Mumford and Major G. St. J. Orde-
Brown, Africans Learn to be French: A Review of Educational Activities in the Seven Federated
Colonies of French West Africa, Based Upon A Tour of French West Africa and Algiers Under-
taken in 1935.
26Manning (1988) mentions the case of the reading book “Mamadou et Beneta” developed in
Dakar, p. 166.
27Yet at the end of the day, in 1960, Senegal was no di¤erent from the other French colonies
such as Cote d’Ivoire and Benin.
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The French assimilation policy was ultimately reserved for a small “advanced”
elite integrated into the colonial system and to whom the French subsequently
passed on the power (Bancel, 2002). For similar reasons to the British model, the
fact that French education provided better prospects could also have resulted in
a less generous state education policy.
In the other colonies, especially the Belgian and Portuguese colonies, the in-
vestment in education was even lower than under the French colonial administra-
tion, even though missionaries partially o¤set the shortfall in State action. These
colonial powers were the ones that converted the populations under their control
the most to Christianity,28 as shown by Table 7. Enrolment rate di¤erences hence
strikingly re‡ect the colonial power’s identity and policy choices. British pol-
icy was long content to develop education that provided no prospects for power,
satisfying a goal to “civilise” without breaking with segregation and combining
missionary action with government action. French policy observed slower “educa-
tional assimilation” and was highly reticent about missionary action. This policy
satis…ed a “modernisation” goal without breaking with paternalism. The other
colonial powers merely left the bulk of the educational load up to the missionaries,
ful…lling primarily an evangelisation goal.
3.3. Persistent di¤erences in 1990
The persistence of a di¤erence over time, from 1960 or 1970 through to 1990,
forms a second piece of evidence of the e¤ect of the colonial power’s identity.
Tables 8 and 9 apply the table 3 and 4 estimates to 1990 data. They show that
the former British colonies do indeed continue to hold the advantage. Over the
thirty years following independence, the former French colonies did not catch up
in human capital terms at all.29 This observation is upheld when the literacy
rate and the gross primary enrolment rate are considered, even though, as with
1960, greater uncertainty a¤ects the estimators for this latter variable for reasons
already mentioned. The gross secondary enrolment rate di¤erentials widened, as
did the primary to secondary graduation rate di¤erences (ratio of the two rates),
28"In the Belgian Congo, for instance, the predominance of the Catholic Church in primary
education was one of the main reasons why that country became overwhelmingly Catholic." (Man-
ning, op. cit., p. 166).
29The current econometric practice is to measure a country’s human capital as the exponential
of the number of years of schooling, in keeping with microeconomic theory (e.g. see Bils and
Klenow, 2000). One year’s di¤erence hence always represents a 100% deviation in human capital,
regardless of the levels concerned.
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which were higher in 1990 than in 1960. The two groups of colonies hence tend
to diverge in terms of total human capital, mainly on the secondary education
side. These average observations obviously do not mean that all the former non-
British colonies were less successful with their education policies than all the
former British colonies. For example, the post-independence educational e¤ort
made by Cote d’Ivoire during its major period of economic growth is clearly in
evidence in the microeconomic data (Table 5). At the secondary school level,
this country managed to catch up with and then largely outstrip Uganda, but
still remained far behind neighbouring Ghana. The di¤erence between the two
leading countries occupied by the two colonial powers in West Africa is more than
one year of schooling, as it is for the average of the countries in the sub region.
Mingat and Suchaut (2000) dedicate a large part of their book to studying
the deviations existing between English-speaking countries and French-speaking
countries in terms of the primary system’s coverage rate. They attribute these
deviations to one main cause: the level of unit costs. In the data they gather for
1970 to 1990, teachers’ wages do indeed appear to be much higher as a percentage
of GDP in the former French colonies than in the former English colonies. Conse-
quently, for a given level of government investment, the additional cost prompts
a rationing of the number of primary school teachers and schools and the num-
ber of pupils per class is hence also higher in the French-speaking countries. We
are obviously unable to check whether this explanation was applied during the
colonial period, but brie‡y, it is probable that the budgetary cost of a primary
school teacher sent from France or even trained in Dakar was higher than the cost
of the subsidy paid by the British government to the missionary schools under
the grant-in-aid system and higher than that of a primary school teacher trained
in the local colleges.30 As found by Mingat and Suchaut, the wage level for pri-
mary school teachers is nonetheless determined by the general level of wages in
the modern sector and by the returns to education in this sector. We will come
back to this point in the last section of this paper. The weight of the French as-
similation policy probably contributed to establishing a long-term nominal wage
standard set in relation to French wages rather than proportional to the country’s
own …nancing capacities.31 In the French franc zone countries, this standard was
30Gi¤ord and Weiskel (op. cit., p. 707) …nd a large deviation between the wages paid to
primary school teachers and those paid to secondary school teachers and university professors in
the former British colonies for the 1950-1960 decade. It would be interesting to check whether
the deviations were smaller on the French side.
31La Porta et al. (1999) show that the level of public wages (as a percentage of per capita
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fostered by the currency’s …xed parity with the French franc. In the countries
outside the French franc zone, however, recurring currency devaluations starting
in the late 1970s prompted a wage adjustment regardless of the countries’ colo-
nial origin.32 Moreover, the principle of equal pay also came into play as regards
the skilled African managerial class (the French “évolués” elite) who worked with
many European expatriates in the administrations and companies. Hence Gi¤ord
and Weiskel attribute the high level of wages for African teachers in the 1960s
to the presence of a large number of European expatriates in the universities (p.
708). The wage and modern-job setting and distribution methods, much like the
relations between the public and private sectors, were at the heart of the African
countries’ political economy and helped de…ne a particular style of development
and management of distribution con‡icts for each group of countries. This is
probably where a large part of the explanation is to be found for the persistence
of colonial di¤erences in the thirty years following independence. As we will see,
the educational di¤erences found are not re‡ected by signi…cant development de-
viations (level of per capita GDP and life expectancy), but primarily by di¤erent
returns to this education.
4. The colonial mark on development and returns to edu-
cation
4.1. The colonial investment and the populations’ standard of living
In addition to schooling, the colonial power’s “modernisation” was also at work in
another important area: transport infrastructures. The top part of Table 10 shows
that, here again, the British colonial power had the advantage over the French. In
1960, the French colonial power had built fewer kilometres of railways and roads.
The road di¤erence persisted in 1990. However, as pointed out by Herbst (2000,
pp. 159-170), these di¤erences are small albeit signi…cant. A more general, albeit
less accurate, indicator of the total stock of capital per worker33 also gives an
average advantage to the former British colonies, but the phenomenon’s variance
GDP) does actually tend to be higher in the “French legal origin” countries. Nevertheless, the
authors do not explore the causes and repercussions of this observation in enough detail (see the
following section).
32On this point, see, for example, Cogneau (2000), pp. 111-114.
33We do not present the stock estimated in 1960, which depends too much on the assumptions
made to construct it. Nevertheless, the …nding is similar.
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totally outweighs the average di¤erence. The estimates made by Frankel (1969)
for 1936 do not appear to suggest that the British colonies (excluding the South
African Union) had a higher stock of capital per capita than the average found in
the other regions.34
Nevertheless, the fact remains that we could have expected the cumulative
educational and infrastructure advantages in the former British colonies to result
in a labour productivity gap or in a total factor productivity gap. The bottom
part of Table 10 shows that this is not the case at all. In 1960, GDP per worker
was actually some 25% higher in the former French colonies than in all the other
colonies, especially the former British colonies. The nature of this initial di¤erence
remains to be seen, given the measurement errors that a¤ect this type of indicator
such as di¤erent national accounting methods inherited from the colonial period
and/or a higher level of administrative and tax registration on the French side.
In 1990, the former British colonies appeared to have caught up with the for-
mer French colonies in terms of labour productivity. A study of an even smaller
sample suggests that the colonial power’s identity did not in‡uence overall factor
productivity at all in 1990.
Table 11 presents the same sort of comparisons, this time using two direct in-
dicators of the populations’ standards of living in the form of per capita GDP and
life expectancy at birth. Using the same database (Summers and Heston, 1991),
the observable per capita GDP di¤erences expressed in terms of purchasing power
parities are the same as those observed for labour productivity. In 1960, the former
French colonies held on to their positive advantage, but its signi…cance was low.
The life expectancy at birth variable was measured using a larger sample calling
for less cautiousness. This variable gives a slight advantage to the former British
colonies in 1960, with an average di¤erence of 1.5 years compared with the former
French colonies. Nevertheless, here again the variable’s variance outweighs the
average di¤erence. We found a deviation of the same magnitude, albeit statisti-
cally fairly insigni…cant, between the two groups of countries for 1990 once we had
controlled for the prevalence of the HIV epidemic, which was greater in the former
British colonies.35 From 1960 to 1990, the two groups of countries posted similar
34See Coquery-Vidrovith and Moniot, op. cit., p. 206. The data available for the French
colonies are underestimated, since they are limited to companies listed on the stock exchange.
35This di¤erence in the prevalence of the AIDS epidemic takes in a large number of hitherto
fairly unclear factors regarding the geographic origin of the epidemic and its propagation vehicles.
Cogneau and Grimm (2002) show that the risk of infection in Ivory Coast is positively correlated
to the level of education.
23
growth and gained four additional years of life expectancy on average compared
with the other types of colonies. Hence in 1990, as with the monetary standard of
living, the main observable di¤erence was between the former British and French
colonies on the one side and the other countries on the other.
Last but not least, Table 12 presents a comparative analysis of the urbanisation
rates in 1960 and 1990. Certain economists consider this variable to be a basic
indicator of the level of development. For example, it is used by Acemoglu et al.
(2002) to identify the “major reversal” in worldwide development following Eu-
ropean colonisation. The regions that were the least urbanised in 1500 saw their
urbanisation rate shoot up while the most urbanised regions entered periods of
decline or stagnation. Nevertheless, their analysis excludes the African continent,
for which historical urbanisation data are particularly hard to reconstitute. The
analysis made here shows that the level of urbanisation in 1960 varied positively
with the number of European settlers in 1900, the age of oldest town36 and the
existence of a coastline (access to the sea). However, it was independent of the
colonial power’s identity, in the same way as per capita GDP and life expectancy.
In keeping with the trends of these other variables over the 1960-1990 period,
the former British and French colonies were also more urbanised than the other
African countries in 1990. This said, the former French colonies were signi…cantly
more urbanised than their British counterparts. The ten-point average urbani-
sation deviation between these two groups is considerable and greater than that
which separates the former British colonies from the other countries. The magni-
tude and signi…cance of this deviation is con…rmed by estimating a …rst di¤erence
model, which purges the estimate of the existence of unobservable set e¤ects.37
The former French colonies hence had both the lowest population density (Table
1) and a population more concentrated in the towns. Administrative centrali-
sation inspired by the French government system was behind the concentration
of business, wealth and infrastructures (including education) in the towns and
especially in the capitals. In the French franc zone, the high level of wages also
helped stimulate the urban economy, attracting many migrants to settle in the
36These two variables are instrumented respectively by settlers’ mortality rates in the 19th
century and by the distance to the North Pole (Mediterranean and the Red Sea) and the distance
to the equator.
37The estimation of parametric and non-parametric treatment models, as in the last section,
also con…rms the existence of this di¤erence. Moreover, the …nding is not altered by excluding
the control variables (proportion of European settlers, access to the sea, age of the oldest town
and oil reserves).
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towns.38 We can actually check that income dualism between agriculture and the
other sectors, as measured by the Bourguignon and Morrison indicator (1998),
was greater in the former French colonies in 1990 (Table 12, last column). The
devaluation of the CFA franc partially changed this state of a¤airs. Moreover,
there was no di¤erence between the two types of colonies in terms of the propor-
tion of the employed labour force working in the agricultural sector. This means
that the non-agricultural activities were more often situated in rural areas in the
former British colonies and linked to the urban markets by slightly denser road
infrastructures.
4.2. Returns to education
Modern growth econometrics typically calculate the macroeconomic returns to
education in keeping with the microeconometric estimates derived from human
capital theory (see, for example, Cohen and Soto, 2001). We hence usually esti-
mate the e¤ect of an additional year of education on labour productivity at 10%
to 20% for less developed countries, with the marginal return tending to decrease
with the population’s average level of education (Bils and Klenow, 2000). In the
case of the African countries, however, it is hard to reconcile this postulate with
the observation. This is because we would expect to observe this same deviation
of 10% to 20% between the former British and former French colonies in terms of
GDP per worker. Following the example of Pritchett (2001), we wondered, in this
case, “Where did the returns to education go in the former British colonies?”
Table 13 uses the case of Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar and Uganda to
illustrate the di¤erences in microeconomic returns to education between former
French and former British colonies. We considered the level of education vari-
able in Table 5 to have a linear e¤ect, by assigning each individual three years of
schooling for each level attained. This was to be able to present …ndings compara-
ble with other studies (in particular, Schultz, 1999). We then constructed a work
experience variable in the same way by subtracting six years and the number of
years of schooling calculated from the individual’s age. We then used the ordinary
least squares method to estimate a Mincer standard gain equation for declared
monthly wages39 and for the population of male non-foreign heads of household
38Madagascar and Guinea are hence atypical of the former French non-landlocked colonies,
with urbanisation rates of just 25% in 1990.
39I would like to thank Constance Torelli for helping me to construct these data. They include
cash bonuses, but exclude bonuses in kind and housing and transport perks for comparability
reasons. In those countries where all the bonuses were available (Ivory Coast and Ghana), the
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aged 25 and over (top part of Table 13). We then estimated the same type of
gain equation for per capita consumer expenditure in those households with des-
ignated heads. The returns to education hence estimated are much higher in the
two former French colonies than in the two former British colonies, regardless of
the variable considered. The two wage extremes are Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, al-
ready analysed by Schultz. We …nd the same result as Schultz, with wage returns
to education being three times lower in Ghana. One additional year of education
secured a 20% higher wage on average in Cote d’Ivoire in the late 1980s as opposed
to just 7% in Ghana in the early 1990s. It also pushed up per capita expenditure
by 9% in Cote d’Ivoire as opposed to just 4% in Ghana.40 The proportions of
wage earners were virtually identical in the two countries,41 meaning that a larger
number of educated individuals were excluded from this type of employment in
Ghana. Hence the average number of years of education for wage earners was
2.6 times higher than the overall average in Cote d’Ivoire as opposed to only 1.5
times higher in Ghana (and in the other two countries). Combined with the high
level of returns, this more selective access to the wage earning class resulted in an
average wage level that was six time higher than per capita GDP in Cote d’Ivoire
as opposed to only twice as high in Ghana (and also in the other two countries).
This explains why Cote d’Ivoire was known as the “republic of good students”,
based on the French “republic of teachers” model. This high level of average
wages appears to be characteristic of the French franc zone (see Cogneau, 2000,
op. cit.). For example, Madagascar came out of the French franc zone in 1975
and does not share this property.
Pritchett (2001) puts forward three factors liable to in‡uence the observed
productive returns to education: (i) the quality of the education, (ii) the existence
of rent-seeking behaviour, and (iii) the demand for skilled labour. A quantitative
growth in education could hence be accompanied by: (i) a drop in the average
quality of learning (either by means of a drop in the quality of the supply or less
selection of pupils), (ii) a spread of rent-seeking behaviour by the most educated
players at the cost of creating productive activities, or (iii) skilled job supply
stagnation resulting in a drop in the relative price of education on the labour
market. Unfortunately, it is beyond our means to identify the weight of these
three factors in the explanation of the di¤erences in returns to education. For
de…nition of the wage variable did not change the …nding in the slightest.
40Quantile regressions on the median and the …rst and last deciles produce the same …nding.
4127% of non-foreign men aged 25 and over, as shown by the comparison between sta¤ numbers
in the two gain equations.
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example, we observed that the primary enrolment di¤erences did indeed result
in literacy di¤erences. This observation shows the limits of the …rst argument
(quality di¤erences), which needs to be better speci…ed with the construction of
a real indicator of the e¤ectiveness of primary schooling from the point of view of
learning reading and writing. The rent-seeking argument entails viewing the e¤ect
of growth in education as the increase in the number of people sharing a set-sized
pie. This argument could be applied especially to secondary and higher education.
In the former British colonies in the 1965-1980 period, it could be said that the
adoption of trade closedness policies and maintaining an overvalued exchange rate
was in keeping with the desire to keep making pro…ts on the access to imports and
currencies. Similarly, the payment of high wages in the former French colonies
was …nanced by taxing foreign trade and, in the case of the French franc zone, by
the …nancing of large tax and external de…cits by the French Treasury. As regards
Pritchett’s third argument, the absence of a signi…cant capital stock di¤erence
(Table 9) and the identical weight of wage-earning employment in the four cases
analysed (Table 13) suggests that the demand for skilled labour did not follow the
rise in the number of educated workers, especially in the former British colonies.
Here again, it would nonetheless be necessary to specify how the macroeconomic
policies applied might have limited the increase in capital and how the colonial
mark and initial quantity of education might have played their role in determining
these policies.42 Last but not least, Pritchett’s three arguments are not necessarily
disconnected. In the absence of job creations, competition for access to modern
wage-earning employment could actually be likened to sharing a set-sized pie.
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) propose a model in which a graduate has the
choice between a productive activity and a rent-seeking activity. However, the
existence of productive wage-earning jobs is itself conditioned by the creation of
companies, to the extent that the crucial choice is de…nitely between company
start-ups and rent seeking. This is also why the above-mentioned research on the
legal and judicial systems focuses on the administrative obstacles to starting up
a company and on capital funding.43 Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny furthermore
42The Barro, Mankiw and Sala-I-Martin model (1995) shows that the economies more open to
international capital ‡ows, such as the former French colonies belonging to the French franc zone,
should have enjoyed a faster accumulation of physical capital (k) and an even faster accumulation
of human capital (h). Yet the higher adjustment costs associated with the investment in human
capital could have o¤set this advantage, resulting in a path parallel to the path of the former
British colonies (a practically constant k=h ratio).
43See La Porta et al., 1998, in particular. The civil law systems are said to hamper the
development of the …nancial markets. This argument is challenged by Rajan and Zingales
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posit that the quality of the education provided also plays a role, by comparing
technical and scienti…c training, more conducive to company start-ups, with legal
and literary training, more likely to prompt rent seeking.
Regardless of the colonial power’s identity, independent Africa as a whole
has hitherto lacked an investment and growth dynamic. It consequently seems
inevitable that the growth in education would have prompted a sharp rise in
competition between graduates for jobs and incomes. This extremely …erce com-
petition could have taken a number of forms, more or less fair and more or less
legal and transparent, in both the economic and political …elds. Here again, re-
gardless of the colonial power’s identity, the national governments were seriously
lacking in their ability to regulate either this competition or the competition for
arable land (Herbst, 2000).
5. Conclusion
This empirical analysis shows that the colonial power’s identity left its mark on
the way schools were run in African societies, and that this mark was still there
thirty years after independence. As regards the quantitative growth in primary
education, the French free and secular education system set up right at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century seems to have been less of a success than the
British system based on a partnership between the missionaries and government.
The Belgian and Portuguese systems relying completely on missionary work were
no more of a success than the French system, save from the point of view of con-
verting greater numbers of people to Christianity. The British were also more
successful at satisfying the African demand for secondary education, whether in
their settlement colonies, and despite the racial segregation associated with this
settlement, or in their extractive colonies. French policy only allowed for a small
elite to enter secondary and higher education and subsequently public service
positions. The main reason for the failure of the French system is probably a
shortfall in human and …nancial resources: a free-of-charge system doing without
the missionary contribution was necessarily more expensive and hence limited in
terms of its growth, especially after the First World War and during the 1930s
depression and the Second World War. Moreover, the payment of high wages to
primary and secondary school teachers and professors in the name of a principle
(2001), who show that market capitalisation was higher in France than in the United States in
1914 and that it was the shocks of 1914-1945 that had a lasting e¤ect on the …nancial markets
of continental Europe.
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of equality and assimilation (equal work for equal pay) pushed these costs up fur-
ther. It remains to be seen whether these higher wages resulted in better quality
education. A comparison of the literacy rates suggests not, but more detailed
analyses are called for in this regard. At any rate, the educational advantage in
the former British colonies was not re‡ected in these countries’ economic perfor-
mances or in the populations’ average standard of living. In both 1960 and 1990,
the inhabitants of the former British colonies were no richer and had no longer
life expectancy than their counterparts in the former French colonies. A study
of the situation in four countries shows that the returns to education were sig-
ni…cantly lower in the former British colonies in the early 1990s. Also of note is
that the development paths of the other countries – former Belgian, Portuguese
and Italian colonies and independent countries such as Ethiopia and Liberia –
were less favourable than those of the former French colonies even though they
had comparable education performances in 1960 and equally developed transport
infrastructures. The wage and infrastructure policy of the former French colonies
moreover gave rise to much faster urbanisation than in the two other groups of
countries. However neo-colonial it may be, it is possible that the French franc
zone institution could have o¤set the former French colonies’ labour cost and
educational distribution handicaps by providing macroeconomic stability.44
There is nowhere in Africa that is actually anywhere close to having the condi-
tions for education to be a source of growth and marked improvement in standards
of living. As argued by Herbst (2000), one of the keys to the question is probably
to be found in the governments’ weakness and lack of legitimacy. The question
as to whether the current democratisation processes can absorb this handicap re-
mains to be answered (Robinson, 2002). Like La Porta et al. (1998 and 1999, op.
cit.), we …nd that the colonial power’s identity and own political philosophy do
have an in‡uence. This in‡uence is to the British colonial power’s advantage in
terms of schooling, but we …nd that this advantage does not give rise to other in-
dicators of welfare, in contrast with the results obtained by Bertocchi and Canova
(2002). Moreover, like Acemoglu et al. (2001 and 2002, op. cit.), we con…rm
the decisive in‡uence of European settlement colonisation on the development of
schooling and economic performances, not forgetting the disastrous ethical conse-
quences of this colonisation in all cases. Racism was the dominant ideology among
the European colonisers despite any moderating e¤ect that liberal, egalitarian or
Christian philosophies may have had.
44Herbst defends this point of view, see Herbst, op. cit. pp. 220-223.
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Table 1 : Explaining islam extension, ethnic fractionalisation, settlement condi-
tions, and the coloniser’s selection
Muslims Ethnic F. E. Settlers F. British F. French
Dist. to Nth Pole -1.857* +0.329* +0.042* -0.054*
(0.231) (0.196) (0.018) (0.026)
Dist. to Equator -1.199* -0.011 +0.044
(0.324) (0.033) (0.041)
Land area +1.557* +0.039 -0.314*
(0.599) (0.063) (0.177)
Settlers mortality -2.093* +0.276 -0.583
(0.566) (0.281) (0.500)
S. mort. unknown -31.33* +2.767 -9.834
(8.286) (4.046) (7.705)
Pop. Density in 1500 (log.) -0.167 -0.739*
(0.371) (0.436)
Morning Humidity -0.085* +0.149*
(0.042) (0.065)
Intercept +29.69* +37.42* +13.38* +6.538* -7.088*
R2 0.599 0.364 0.256
Pseudo R2 0.300 0.427
N 45
Method : The …rst three columns are OLS estimates. The last two columns are probit
estimates. *: signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 10-percent level.
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Table 2 : Di¤erences in education between colonial origins, GMM estimators
Average years of schooling 1960 Literacy 1970
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F. British +1.465* +1.470* +15.14* +13.48*
(0.322) (0.300) (6.049) (4.304)
F. French +0.205 +0.704* -4.510 +1.491
(0.211) (0.332) (4.178) (4.800)
Muslims (I) -0.012* -0.229*
(0.004) (0.064)
Settlers (I) +0.142* +1.516*
(0.030) (0.441)
Ethnic F. (I) -0.006 -0.335*
(0.005) (0.094)
p-value Br.=Fr. 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.005
R2 0.421 0.340
p-value Sargan 0.917 0.533
N 33 40
Gross Primary Enr. 1960 Gross Secondary Enroll. 1960
(5) (6) (7) (8)
F. British +7.930 +9.603 +1.943 +0.613
(10.10) (10.35) (1.480) (1.305)
F. French -1.690 +4.922 +0.800 -0.011
(9.145) (10.78) (1.103) (1.259)
Muslims (I) -0.140 +0.050*
(0.132) (0.020)
Settlers (I) +2.422* +0.642*
(0.992) (0.146)
Ethnic F. (I) -0.296 -0.012
(0.212) (0.026)
p-value Br.=Fr. 0.282 0.524 0.462 0.603
R2 0.033 0.046
p-value Sargan 0.772 0.544
N 41 38
Method and Sources: (I) denotes an instrumented variable. Column (2) is a GMM
estimation with distance to the North Pole, latitude, settlers’ mortality and arable
land area as instruments for the proportion of Muslims, ethnic fragmentation and the
proportion of European settlers in 1900. The test "F. Br.=F. Fr." is a Fisher test of
equality of the …rst two coe¢cients of regressions, with the p-value reported.
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Table 3 : Di¤erences in education in 1960, comparing selection-corrected treat-
ment estimators and matching estimators of colonial origins
Average years of schooling 1960
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 1.0 Ä 1.3 -0.9
95% conf. interval [0.5;1.6] [0.4;2.0] [-1.5;0.1]
Matched / Control 13/9 19/8
F.British vs F.French 0.6 0.2 1.1 -1.1
95% conf. interval [-.0;1.2] [-0.4;0.9] [-0.6;1.9] [-3.4;-0.1]
Matched / Control 9/4 11/4
N (n) 33 (27)
Literacy 1970
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 15.4 9.5 19.4 -17.2
95% conf. interval [7.1;23.7] [-5.9;25.0] [3.8;31.7] [-37.3;-9.4]
Matched / Control 12/8 24/7
F.British vs F.French 11.4. 11.7 15.9 -13.2
95% conf. interval [3.7;19.1] [2.4;21.1] [-1.8;35.3] [-28.5;1.1]
Matched / Control 8/6 13/3
N (n) 39 (28)
Method : The e¤ect of the colonial power’s identity is estimated using either the se-
lection correction method or the matching nearest neighbour method. Column (OLS)
corresponds to a reduced form of the Table 2 column (2) models where the outcome
variable is regressed on the distance to the North Pole, the distance to the equator,
the arable land area, settlers’ mortality and a dummy variable indicating whether the
country was a British colony. (SEL) adds a selection correction to (OLS) based on the
probit model of the last column in Table 1, and estimated by a two-step method; the Ä
sign means that the correlation parameter between unobservables was estimated outside
the [-1;+1] interval, making identi…cation questionable. (MB) and (MnB) are matching
estimators again based on the probit models of table 1 which gives the propensity score
P(S). (MB) corresponds to the counterfactual e¤ect on former British colonies, while
(MnB) corresponds to the counterfactual e¤ect on former non-British colonies. A com-
mon support condition is introduced for the matching estimators, using only treated
observations for which a P(S)-based match is close enough (20 percentage points). The
number of matched units based on this condition are shown in the table, followed by
the size of the control group. The con…dence intervals are estimated with one thousand
bootstrap replications. N is the number of available observations for the variable across
the entire sample, while n is the number of observations for the sample restricted to
former British and former French colonies.
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Table 4 : Enrolment di¤erences in 1960, comparing selection-corrected treatment
estimators and matching estimators of colonial origins
Gross primary enrolment 1960
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 8.0 -13.7 8.2 -14.1
95% conf. interval [-10.7;26.8] [-54.5;27.1] [-40.0;29.8] [-66.7;-0.1]
Matched / Control 12/9 26/7
F.British vs F.French 1.2 4.5 9.6 -2.5
95% conf. interval [-19.1;21.6] [-20.9;29.8] [-27.0;45.8] [-35.6;20.8]
Matched / Control 8/6 14/3
N (n) 40 (29)
Gross Secondary Enrolment 1960
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 1.4 -1.3 2.7 -3.3
95% conf. interval [-0.6;3.3] [-6.3;3.8] [0.3;7.5] [-8.1;2.1]
Matched / Control 13/9 23/8
F.British vs F.French 1.5 0.9 2.1 -0.3
95% conf. interval [-1.1;4.2] [-2.5;4.4] [-2.0;7.1] [-4.2;4.1]
Matched / Control 9/4 11/4
N (n) 37 (27)
Ratio Secondary/Primary 1960
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.04
95% conf. interval [-.00;.05] [-.02;.10] [-.05;.10] [-.16;.00]
Matched / Control 12/9 23/7
F.British vs F.French 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02
95% conf. interval [-.00;.07] [-.02;.07] [-.06;.09] [-.07;.06]
Matched / Control 8/4 11/3
N (n) 36 (26)
Method : See table 3.
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Table 5 : Some schooling indicators for four countries sorted by cohort
Age of the individual at the country’s independence
40 & + 30-39 20-29 10-19 0-9 Born later
Some primary
Uganda 36.0 47.9 66.8 77.0 83.4 83.5
Ghana 13.0 31.7 39.7 58.3 73.3 81.9
Côte d’Ivoire 5.2 11.1 21.3 42.5 64.6 67.2
Madagascar 44.6 52.5 57.7 73.2 78.4 84.2
Completed Primary
Uganda 4.1 6.2 19.4 33.2 41.8 42.5
Ghana 9.8 25.7 35.2 50.3 67.1 75.9
Côte d’Ivoire 2.3 6.1 13.0 32.3 54.8 56.6
Madagascar 4.6 6.8 10.8 24.8 31.5 48.9
Completed Middle
Uganda 2.8 1.8 7.8 12.4 16.6 18.3
Ghana 4.1 15.9 26.9 40.8 56.9 64.5
Côte d’Ivoire 0.1 0.5 2.8 14.9 32.1 34.8
Madagascar 1.9 1.7 6.0 14.8 16.9 19.5
Completed Secondary
Uganda 0.3 0.1 2.8 5.9 6.6 6.7
Ghana 0.0 3.1 4.5 8.9 11.0 15.6
Côte d’Ivoire 0.1 0.2 0.8 6.1 13.3 (7.8)
Madagascar 0.0 0.7 1.8 4.7 6.9 5.7
Source: Household surveys described in Appendix B. Coverage: Men over 25 years old,
born in the country.
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Table 6 : Some schooling indicators for four countries for 1910-1960
Number of Children in schools
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 Indep.
Primary schools
Uganda ... ... 17 [82] 224 (435)
Ghana 17 41 53 (62) 234 471
Côte d’Ivoire 1.0 ... ... 14 32 239
Madagascar ... ... ... [182] 238 450
Secondary Schools
Uganda ... ... 0.2> 1.6> 11 (7.8)
Ghana ... 0.7 1.3 [3.1] 73 153
Côte d’Ivoire ... ... ... ... 1.3 11
Madagascar ... ... ... [7.8] 11 25
Higher Education
Uganda ... ... ... ... ... ...
Ghana ... ... ... ... 208 960
Côte d’Ivoire ... ... ... ... ... ...
Madagascar ... ... ... ... 197 1130
( ): governement-aided schools only; [ ]: year is not accurate ; >: boy’s schools
only. Source: B.R. Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, 1750-1993
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Table 7 : Di¤erences in evangelisation between colonial origins, GMM estimators
Christians (%)
1960 1990
F. British -3.383 -12.31*
(12.64) (7.057)
F. French -23.42* -16.88*
(12.74) (7.539)
Muslims (I) -0.611*
(0.093)
Ethnic F. (I) +0.256*
(0.156)
Settlers 1900 (I) +1.088
(0.773)
p-value Br.=Fr. 0.056 0.492
p-value Sargan 0.350
N 45
Method and Sources: see table 2.
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Table 8 : Di¤erences in education in 1990, comparing IV estimators and matching
estimators of colonial origins
Average years of schooling 1990
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 1.8 0.5 2.0 -1.8
95% conf. interval [0.7;2.8] [-2.4;3.3] [0.4;3.5] [-3.4;-0.4]
Matched / Control 13/9 22/8
F.British vs F.French 1.1 0.9 1.7 -1.8
95% conf. interval [-0.2;2.5] [-0.8;2.7] [-1.3;3.8] [-3.3;0.1]
Matched / Control 9/5 13/4
N (n) 37 (29)
Literacy 1990
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 18.6 12.8 22.5 -17.6
95% conf. interval [5.8;31.4] [-10.6;36.2] [2.4;40.7] [-34.0;-6.2]
Matched / Control 12/8 24/7
F.British vs F.French 15.1 16.4 18.3 -21.0
95% conf. interval [1.1;29.0] [-0.6;33.4] [-6.0;45.6] [-41.5;-5.6]
Matched / Control 8/6 13/3
N (n) 39 (28)
Method : See table 3.
41
Table 9 : Enrolment di¤erences in 1990, comparing selection-corrected treatment
estimators and matching estimators of colonial origins
Gross primary enrollment 1990
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 11.0 19.0 11.7 -7.9
95% conf. interval [-10.3;32.2] [-27.9;65.9] [-21.0;42.9] [-40.3;15.6]
Matched / Control 13/9 23/8
F.British vs F.French 1.6 12.3 4.0 -5.1
95% conf. interval [-24.3;27.5] [-20.9;78.0] [-48.0;54.5] [-37.5;37.5]
Matched / Control 9/6 14/4
N 38 (31)
Gross Secondary Enrollment 1990
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 14.5 14.2 18.7 -15.1
95% conf. interval [1.3;27.8] [-15.7;44.2] [2.1;37.2] [-52.3;-1.2]
Matched / Control 13/8 22/8
F.British vs F.French 8.6 10.5 13.8 -7.6
95% conf. interval [-5.5;22.8] [-7.4;28.5] [-19.1;37.0] [-29.3;-19.7]
Matched / Control 9/6 14/4
N 37 (31)
Ratio Secondary/Primary 1990
Reduced linear parametric Reduced non-parametric
(OLS) (SEL) (MB) (MnB)
F.British vs All 0.13 0.10 0.18 -0.14
95% conf. interval [.03;.23] [-.13;.32] [.06;.40] [-.47;.00]
Matched / Control 13/8 22/8
F.British vs F.French 0.11 0.08 0.13 -0.10
95% conf. interval [.03;.22] [-.06;.22] [-.04;.34] [-.27;.18]
Matched / Control 9/6 14/4
N 37 (31)
Method : See table 3.
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Table 10 : Investment and productivity di¤erences between colonial origins
Railway lines length Roads Density Capital per worker
1925 1960 1960 1990 1990
F. British +0.883 +0.805 -0.019 -0.006 +0.623
(0.592) (0.583) (0.026) (0.040) (0.648)
F. French +0.025 -0.380 -0.049* -0.044 +0.390
(0.485) (0.577) (0.025) (0.040) (0.569)
Settlers 1900 +0.586* +0.622* +0.090*
(0.150) (0.159) (0.021)
Land area +0.181* +0.210* -0.011* -0.018*
(0.106) (0.121) (0.003) (0.006)
(Land area)2/100 -0.845* -0.837 +0.032* +0.052*
(0.569) (0.743) (0.014) (0.020)
Oil reserves +3.8e-6*
(6.2e-7)
p-value Br.=Fr. 0.072 0.025 0.012 0.043 0.584
R2 0.780 0.779 0.489 0.346 0.419
N 45 33 44 34
GDP per worker (log.) FGP (log.)
1960 1990 Growth 60-90 1990
F. British -0.012 +0.368* +0.124 -0.068
(0.158) (0.139) (0.196) (0.408)
F. French +0.251* +0.420* +0.115 +0.164
(0.123) (0.149) (0.202) (0.353)
Settlers 1900 (I) +0.062* +0.081* +0.009 +0.075*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.030)
Ethnic F. (I) -0.001 -0.009 -0.003 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006)
Oil reserves +2.3e-6* +1.5e-6* +1.9e-6*
(5.6e-7) (3.5e-7) (5.9e-7)
p-value Br.=Fr. 0.073 0.647 0.946 0.283
p-value Sargan 0.501 0.180 0.020 0.155
N 40 34 32 34
Method : Initial (1960) capital stock is computed as K=Y = I=Y=(g + ± + n), where
the investment rate is I=Y , the growth rate is Y=L (g), and the population growth
rate (n) equal to the country’s averages over the 1960-70 period, and where ± = 0:07,
as in Bils and Klenow (2000). The log. of FGP is computed as Log(Y=L)-0:5(K=Y ),
without taking into account any di¤erence in average schooling (unlike Hall and Jones,
1999).
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Table 11 : Di¤erences in per capita GDP and life expectancy at birth between
colonial origins, GMM estimators
GDP per capita Life expectancy
1960 1990 1960 1990 Var. 60-90
F. British -0.091 +0.412* +2.758 +8.737* +5.056*
(0.175) (0.154) (2.030) (2.787) (1.571)
F. French +0.147 +0.413* +1.131 +6.675* +4.508*
(0.138) (0.169) (1.556) (2.378) (1.501)
Settlers 1900 (I) +0.058* +0.082* +0.694* +1.411* +0.750*
(0.020) (0.144) (0.253) (0.546) (0.305)
Ethnic F. (I) -0.002 -0.010* -0.077* -0.115* -0.036
(0.003) (0.003) (0.033) (0.056) (0.029)
Oil reserves +2.1e-6* +4.1e-6* +2.5e-6*
(5.6e-7) (6.5e-7) (4.2e-7)
HIV prev. 1999 (I) -0.354 -0.363*
(0.227) (0.137)
p-value Br.=Fr. 0.108 0.990 0.329 0.296 0.673
N 40 34 45
p-value Sargan 0.196 0.183 0.748 0.969 0.438
Method : The instruments used for the proportion of European settlers in 1900, ethnic
fractionalisation and HIV prevalence (circa 1999) are settlers’ mortality in the 19th
century, distance to the North Pole and the equator and the arable land area.
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Table 12 : Di¤erences in urbanisation between colonial origins, GMM estimators
Urbanisation rate Var. of urb. rate Rel. Labor Prod.
1960 1990 1960-1990 1990
F. British +1.399 +7.878* +5.800* +0.001
(2.982) (3.203) (2.546) (0.069)
F. French +4.517 +18.77* +10.58* -0.133*
(2.997) (3.613) (2.822) (0.067)
Settlers (I) +0.345 +0.933* -0.295 -0.025
(0.507) (0.330) (0.500) (0.019)
Landlocked -7.879* -16.37* -6.053* -0.002
(2.828) (3.392) (3.005) (0.002)
Age 1st city (I) +0.496* +0.040 -0.443*
(0.129) (0.234) (0.180)
Oil reserves +1.4e-5* +1.4e-5* -2.1e-7
(1.9e-6) (1.5e-6) (3.5e-7)
p-value Br.=Fr. 0.260 0.001 0.081 0.047
p-value Sargan 0.442 0.059 0.105 0.160
N 45 41
Method and sources: The instruments used for the proportion of European settlers in
1900 and the age of the …rst city are settlers’ mortality in the 19th century and distance
to the North Pole and the equator.
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Table 13 : Di¤erences in returns to education in four case-study countries
C.d’Ivoire Madagascar Ghana Uganda
Monthly wages (log.)
Education +0.200 +0.151 +0.070 +0.100
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Experience +0.071 +0.069 +0.044 +0.030
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Exp. sq. / 100 -0.063 -0.081 -0.050 -0.058
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
R2 0.488 0.381 0.139 0.221
N 1401 1048 768 1830
Mean wage in % per cap. GNP 618 265 232 228
per capita GNP in current $ 760 220 420 200
Average years of education 6.34 6.10 7.88 5.73
Consumer expenditures per head (log.)
Education +0.093 +0.131 +0.041 +0.072
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Experience -0.006 -0.006 -0.023 -0.010
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Exp. sq. / 100 +0.006 +0.015 +0.026 +0.012
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
R2 0.280 0.245 0.077 0.132
N 5101 3305 2834 6232
Average cons.exp. in PPA 1368 434 1748 528
Average years of education 2.47 3.42 5.23 3.75
Field: Male heads of household aged 25 and over; Method: Ordinary least squares.
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A. Micro-variables and Micro-surveys
A.1. Variables
A.1.1. Education
Primary education is de…ned in Ghana as grades P1 to P6. Middle school covers the
M1 to M4 levels. Secondary is S1 to S5, LS and US, and T1 to T4 (technical schools).
The Ghanaian system was reformed in 1987, reducing the length of the pre-university
education from "6-4-5-2" to "6-3-3", i.e. from 17 years to 12 years, but our sample
aged 25 and over in 1992 did not experience the new system. Primary education is
de…ned in Uganda as P1 to P7. Middle school covers the S1 to S4 levels, or J1 to
J3. Secondary covers S5, S6 and specialised training. The Ugandan system is "7-
4-2".Primary education in Cote d’Ivoire and Madagascar covers CP1, CP2,45 CE1,
CE2, CM1 and CM2 grades. Middle School concerns the 6th, 5th, 4th and 3rd levels.
Secondary school covers the 2nd and 1st grades and the last year in school (called
Terminale). The Ivorian system is a "7-4-3" and the Malagasy system is a "6-4-3".
A.1.2. Income
The monthly wage is de…ned as basic wages plus cash bonuses. It excludes bonuses in
kind and transport and housing perks (see footnote 41). Consumer expenditures per
head is the survey’s estimate of total expenditure divided by the number of people in
the household.
A.2. Surveys
A.2.1. Ghana
The third round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS3), which started in 1991
and ended in 1992. The sample consisted of 4,552 households, spread throughout the
country in 407 enumeration areas.
A.2.2. Côte d’Ivoire
The data comes from the four Enquêtes Permanentes auprès des Ménages (EPAM)
conducted in 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. We pooled the four surveys to obtain a
database of 9,564 households and 50,697 individuals.
45CP only in Madagascar.
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A.2.3. Madagascar
The Enquête Intégrale auprès des Ménages (EPM93) was carried out from April 1993
to April 1994. It consists of a sample of 4,508 households and 22,714 individuals with
a three-stage strati…ed sampling method.
A.2.4. Uganda
The Uganda National Integrated Household Survey (IHS) was conducted from March
1992 to March 1993. It covered 9,924 households, 48,484 individuals, 9,501 men aged
20 and over and 10,325 women aged 20 and over. A two-stage sampling method was
used, except in a few districts where a three-stage sampling method was applied.
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Appendix B: Macro-variables construction and sources
VARIABLES DEFINITION SOURCE
Average years of schooling 1960, 1990 age 15-60 pop., C&S completed by B&L when missing Cohen & Soto (2001), Barro & Lee (1996)
Literacy 1970, 1990 age 15 & above pop. who cannot read and write World Development Indicators (2001)
Primary & Secondary 1960, 1990 Gross primary and secondary enrolment rates World Development Indicators (2001)
Railway lines length 1925, 1960 in thousand of kilometers Mitchell (2001)
Roads density 1960 # of kilometers of roads per km2 of land area Herbst (2000)
Roads density 1990 # of kilometers of roads per km2 of land area Parker (1997)
GDP per worker 1960, 1990 Real GDP in int. dollars divided by labor force (RGDPW) Summers and Heston (1991)
GDP per capita 1960, 1990 GDP in int. dollars divided by population (CGDP) Summers and Heston (1991)
Capital per worker 1960, 1990 Computed from GDP and Investment (see table 10) Summers and Heston (1991)
Factor Global Productivity 1960, 1990 Computed from GDP and Capital per worker (see table 10) Summers and Heston (1991)
Life expectancy 1960, 1990 Life expectancy at birth World Development Indicators (2001)
Urbanization rate 1960, 1990 % of urban population in total population World Development Indicators (2001)
Muslims proportion % of muslims in population Parker (1997)
Ethnic Fractionalization % of the most num. ethnic group in the pop. with (-) sign Parker (1997)
European settlers proportion 1900 % of european settlers in the pop. in 1900 Acemoglu et al.(2000), Mac Evedy & Jones (1975)
Settlers mortality XIXth century Log. of mortality estimate for european settlers Acemoglu et al.(2000)
Age of 1st city Date of creation of the …rst city with (-) sign Parker (1997)
HIV prevalence 1999 % of 15-49 years old pop. infected by HIV UNAIDS (2001)
Distance to north pole, equator Parker (1997)
Morning Humidity % max. of humidity in the morning Parker (1997)
Arable land area, Land area in square kilometers World Development Indicators (2001)
Population density in 1500 Total population in 1500 divided by arable land area in 1970 Mac Evedy and Jones (1978), WDI (2001)
Oil reserves Estimate at the beginning of the 1990s Parker (1997)
Number of minerals Estimate at the beginning of the 1990s Parker (1997)
Landlocked Non-existence of an acces to an open sea Parker (1997)
Relative Labor Productivity Ratio of productivities of labor: agriculture vs. other sectors World Development Indicators (2001)
